* docs(mavlink): present link encryption alongside message signing The hardening guide told integrators that production deployments must enable message signing, presenting it as the only way to secure a MAVLink link. Encrypting the link below MAVLink, with an encrypted radio, a VPN or IPsec, is at least as strong: it uses standard, reviewed cryptography, it gives confidentiality as well as authentication, and it covers every interface on the link rather than only MAVLink. Present both options, and reword the passages that assumed signing was the only one. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * docs(security): develop security fixes in public pull requests Record that fixes are developed as ordinary public pull requests, with no private forks and no embargoed branches. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * docs(security): add security scope document Describe the boundary the code implements today: what PX4 protects, what it assumes about the layers beneath it, what the shipped default does and does not do, and two lists for what is always in scope and what is out. It describes the boundary rather than pre-deciding reports. A finding that fits neither list stays a judgement call that maintainers make on the report. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * docs(security): list a security maintainer for report triage Security report triage had no named owner, so an unacknowledged report had nowhere to go except the release managers. Add a Security block to the maintainers list, and point the follow-up path in SECURITY.md at it. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * docs(mavlink): note that the first signing key is unauthenticated The guide already says to provision over a trusted link, and the info box says that changing or disabling a key requires a signed message. It does not say that setting the first one cannot, since there is no key to sign with yet, so a reader can come away believing provisioning itself is protected. Say plainly that the window exists, what an attacker gets from it, and how to recover. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m] Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * Apply batched suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de> Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * feat(security): more review fixup * fix(security): only 1.18 gets security bugfixes * fix(security): link to SECURITY_SCOPE * fix(securiy): small wording fixups * docs(security): scope by attacker position, not bug class The "Always in scope" list made any memory corruption, race or hang a vulnerability regardless of who can reach it. That is not how reports have been handled: sanitizer runs in SITL have found and fixed many such bugs as ordinary PRs, and a peer on an unsecured link already has a shell. Replace it with one test: a finding is a vulnerability when it gives capability to an attacker who has neither the operator's access nor physical access. Keep the in-tree board configuration rule, point to the sanitizer docs, and fix two typos. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m] Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * fix(docs): formatting * fix(maintainers): add Ramon to security as well * docs(security): draw the boundary as a mermaid diagram GitHub renders mermaid natively, so the boundary diagram no longer has to be maintained as hand-aligned ASCII. Label the two zones with the wording of the sentences below it, so the picture and the prose say the same thing. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> * fix(docs): review fixups * docs(security): say how to isolate the offboard transports A direct cable between flight controller and companion is not enough on its own: the agent or router republishes into the DDS or Zenoh network on the companion, so that network is inside the boundary too. Keep the scope document to what is inside the boundary and put the isolation advice next to the uXRCE-DDS and Zenoh setup instructions. Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> --------- Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch> Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de> Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
The autopilot stack the industry builds on.
About
PX4 is an open-source autopilot stack for drones and unmanned vehicles. It supports multirotors, fixed-wing, VTOL, rovers, and many more experimental platforms from racing quads to industrial survey aircraft. It runs on NuttX, Linux, and macOS. Licensed under BSD 3-Clause.
Why PX4
Modular architecture. PX4 is built around uORB, a DDS-compatible publish/subscribe middleware. Modules are fully parallelized and thread safe. You can build custom configurations and trim what you don't need.
Wide hardware support. PX4 runs on a wide range of autopilot boards and supports an extensive set of sensors, telemetry radios, and actuators through the Pixhawk ecosystem.
Developer friendly. First-class support for MAVLink and DDS / ROS 2 integration. Comprehensive SITL simulation, hardware-in-the-loop testing, and log analysis tools. An active developer community on Discord and the weekly dev call.
Vendor neutral governance. PX4 is hosted under the Dronecode Foundation, part of the Linux Foundation. Business-friendly BSD-3 license. No single vendor controls the roadmap.
Supported Vehicles
|
Multicopter |
Fixed Wing |
VTOL |
Rover |
…and many more: helicopters, autogyros, airships, submarines, boats, and other experimental platforms. These frames have basic support but are not part of the regular flight-test program. See the full airframe reference.
Try PX4
Run PX4 in simulation with a single command. No build tools, no dependencies beyond Docker:
docker run --rm -it -p 14550:14550/udp px4io/px4-sitl:latest
Open QGroundControl and fly. See PX4 Simulation Quickstart for more options.
Build from Source
git clone https://github.com/PX4/PX4-Autopilot.git --recursive
cd PX4-Autopilot
make px4_sitl
Note
See the Development Guide for toolchain setup and build options.
Documentation & Resources
| Resource | Description |
|---|---|
| User Guide | Build, configure, and fly with PX4 |
| Developer Guide | Modify the flight stack, add peripherals, port to new hardware |
| Airframe Reference | Full list of supported frames |
| Autopilot Hardware | Compatible flight controllers |
| Release Notes | What's new in each release |
| Contribution Guide | How to contribute to PX4 |
Community
- Weekly Dev Call — open to all developers (Dronecode calendar)
- Discord — Join the Dronecode server
- Discussion Forum — PX4 Discuss
- Maintainers — see
MAINTAINERS.md - Contributor Stats — LFX Insights
Contributing
We welcome contributions of all kinds — bug reports, documentation, new features, and code reviews. Please read the Contribution Guide to get started.
Citation
If you use PX4 in academic work, please cite it. BibTeX:
@software{px4_autopilot,
author = {Meier, Lorenz and {The PX4 Contributors}},
title = {{PX4 Autopilot}},
publisher = {Zenodo},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.595432},
url = {https://px4.io}
}
The DOI above is a Zenodo concept DOI that always resolves to the latest release. For a version-pinned citation, see the Zenodo record or our CITATION.cff.
Governance
The PX4 Autopilot project is hosted by the Dronecode Foundation, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project. Dronecode holds all PX4 trademarks and serves as the project's legal guardian, ensuring vendor-neutral stewardship — no single company owns the name or controls the roadmap. The source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause license, so you are free to use, modify, and distribute it in your own projects.