f5586139e4 feat(security): define security scope (#28571)
* docs(mavlink): present link encryption alongside message signing

The hardening guide told integrators that production deployments must
enable message signing, presenting it as the only way to secure a MAVLink
link. Encrypting the link below MAVLink, with an encrypted radio, a VPN or
IPsec, is at least as strong: it uses standard, reviewed cryptography, it
gives confidentiality as well as authentication, and it covers every
interface on the link rather than only MAVLink.

Present both options, and reword the passages that assumed signing was the
only one.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* docs(security): develop security fixes in public pull requests

Record that fixes are developed as ordinary public pull requests, with no
private forks and no embargoed branches.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* docs(security): add security scope document

Describe the boundary the code implements today: what PX4 protects, what it
assumes about the layers beneath it, what the shipped default does and does
not do, and two lists for what is always in scope and what is out. It
describes the boundary rather than pre-deciding reports. A finding that fits
neither list stays a judgement call that maintainers make on the report.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* docs(security): list a security maintainer for report triage

Security report triage had no named owner, so an unacknowledged report had
nowhere to go except the release managers. Add a Security block to the
maintainers list, and point the follow-up path in SECURITY.md at it.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* docs(mavlink): note that the first signing key is unauthenticated

The guide already says to provision over a trusted link, and the info box says
that changing or disabling a key requires a signed message. It does not say that
setting the first one cannot, since there is no key to sign with yet, so a reader
can come away believing provisioning itself is protected.

Say plainly that the window exists, what an attacker gets from it, and how to
recover.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* Apply batched suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* feat(security): more review fixup

* fix(security): only 1.18 gets security bugfixes

* fix(security): link to SECURITY_SCOPE

* fix(securiy): small wording fixups

* docs(security): scope by attacker position, not bug class

The "Always in scope" list made any memory corruption, race or hang a
vulnerability regardless of who can reach it. That is not how reports
have been handled: sanitizer runs in SITL have found and fixed many
such bugs as ordinary PRs, and a peer on an unsecured link already has
a shell.

Replace it with one test: a finding is a vulnerability when it gives
capability to an attacker who has neither the operator's access nor
physical access. Keep the in-tree board configuration rule, point to
the sanitizer docs, and fix two typos.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* fix(docs): formatting

* fix(maintainers): add Ramon to security as well

* docs(security): draw the boundary as a mermaid diagram

GitHub renders mermaid natively, so the boundary diagram no longer has to
be maintained as hand-aligned ASCII. Label the two zones with the wording
of the sentences below it, so the picture and the prose say the same
thing.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

* fix(docs): review fixups

* docs(security): say how to isolate the offboard transports

A direct cable between flight controller and companion is not enough on
its own: the agent or router republishes into the DDS or Zenoh network
on the companion, so that network is inside the boundary too.

Keep the scope document to what is inside the boundary and put the
isolation advice next to the uXRCE-DDS and Zenoh setup instructions.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>

---------

Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
2026-09-21 10:49:01 +12:00
…

PX4 Autopilot

The autopilot stack the industry builds on.

Release DOI Discord

OpenSSF Best Practices LFX Health Score LFX Contributors LFX Active Contributors


About

PX4 is an open-source autopilot stack for drones and unmanned vehicles. It supports multirotors, fixed-wing, VTOL, rovers, and many more experimental platforms from racing quads to industrial survey aircraft. It runs on NuttX, Linux, and macOS. Licensed under BSD 3-Clause.

Why PX4

Modular architecture. PX4 is built around uORB, a DDS-compatible publish/subscribe middleware. Modules are fully parallelized and thread safe. You can build custom configurations and trim what you don't need.

Wide hardware support. PX4 runs on a wide range of autopilot boards and supports an extensive set of sensors, telemetry radios, and actuators through the Pixhawk ecosystem.

Developer friendly. First-class support for MAVLink and DDS / ROS 2 integration. Comprehensive SITL simulation, hardware-in-the-loop testing, and log analysis tools. An active developer community on Discord and the weekly dev call.

Vendor neutral governance. PX4 is hosted under the Dronecode Foundation, part of the Linux Foundation. Business-friendly BSD-3 license. No single vendor controls the roadmap.

Supported Vehicles

Multicopter
Multicopter
Fixed Wing
Fixed Wing
VTOL
VTOL
Rover
Rover

…and many more: helicopters, autogyros, airships, submarines, boats, and other experimental platforms. These frames have basic support but are not part of the regular flight-test program. See the full airframe reference.

Try PX4

Run PX4 in simulation with a single command. No build tools, no dependencies beyond Docker:

docker run --rm -it -p 14550:14550/udp px4io/px4-sitl:latest

Open QGroundControl and fly. See PX4 Simulation Quickstart for more options.

Build from Source

git clone https://github.com/PX4/PX4-Autopilot.git --recursive
cd PX4-Autopilot
make px4_sitl

Note

See the Development Guide for toolchain setup and build options.

Documentation & Resources

Resource Description
User Guide Build, configure, and fly with PX4
Developer Guide Modify the flight stack, add peripherals, port to new hardware
Airframe Reference Full list of supported frames
Autopilot Hardware Compatible flight controllers
Release Notes What's new in each release
Contribution Guide How to contribute to PX4

Community

Contributing

We welcome contributions of all kinds — bug reports, documentation, new features, and code reviews. Please read the Contribution Guide to get started.

Citation

If you use PX4 in academic work, please cite it. BibTeX:

@software{px4_autopilot,
  author    = {Meier, Lorenz and {The PX4 Contributors}},
  title     = {{PX4 Autopilot}},
  publisher = {Zenodo},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.595432},
  url       = {https://px4.io}
}

The DOI above is a Zenodo concept DOI that always resolves to the latest release. For a version-pinned citation, see the Zenodo record or our CITATION.cff.

Governance

The PX4 Autopilot project is hosted by the Dronecode Foundation, a Linux Foundation Collaborative Project. Dronecode holds all PX4 trademarks and serves as the project's legal guardian, ensuring vendor-neutral stewardship — no single company owns the name or controls the roadmap. The source code is licensed under the BSD 3-Clause license, so you are free to use, modify, and distribute it in your own projects.

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