* fix(dataman_client): keep request topic advertised on client teardown
* fix(uorb): keep shared topics advertised on publisher teardown
Single-instance publications share one advertised flag, so destroying one
publisher must not hide updates from the others.
Keep automatic unadvertising in PublicationMultiBase and remove the
DatamanClient workaround. Cover surviving publishers and instance reuse,
and reset retained input samples between test cases.
Tested: make tests (215/215), make format.
Signed-off-by: jonas <jonas.perolini@rigi.tech>
Assisted-by: Codex
* docs(uorb): correct unadvertise comments and document teardown
The unadvertise comment claimed it has no effect on single-instance
topics, which is how one publisher's teardown came to hide the others.
State what clearing the shared flag does, and document that only
PublicationMulti releases its instance on destruction.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: jonas <jonas.perolini@rigi.tech>
* test(uorb): keep test cases independent of retained samples
A destroyed single-instance publication now leaves its last sample
visible, so ManualControlTest, test_prec_takeoff and mixer_module_tests
passed only in declaration order and failed under --gtest_shuffle.
Reset with an inert sample where one exists, otherwise unadvertise the
test's own publications, and drop module outputs left over from a
previous case.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: jonas <jonas.perolini@rigi.tech>
* fix(boards): drop the PublicationBase destructor from the ITCM lists
The destructor is now trivial and no longer emitted, so itcm_check.py
fails on the missing section.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5-5
Signed-off-by: Jacob Dahl <dahl.jakejacob@gmail.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: jonas <jonas.perolini@rigi.tech>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Dahl <dahl.jakejacob@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: jonas <jonas.perolini@rigi.tech>
Co-authored-by: Jacob Dahl <dahl.jakejacob@gmail.com>
* docs(mavlink): present link encryption alongside message signing
The hardening guide told integrators that production deployments must
enable message signing, presenting it as the only way to secure a MAVLink
link. Encrypting the link below MAVLink, with an encrypted radio, a VPN or
IPsec, is at least as strong: it uses standard, reviewed cryptography, it
gives confidentiality as well as authentication, and it covers every
interface on the link rather than only MAVLink.
Present both options, and reword the passages that assumed signing was the
only one.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): develop security fixes in public pull requests
Record that fixes are developed as ordinary public pull requests, with no
private forks and no embargoed branches.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): add security scope document
Describe the boundary the code implements today: what PX4 protects, what it
assumes about the layers beneath it, what the shipped default does and does
not do, and two lists for what is always in scope and what is out. It
describes the boundary rather than pre-deciding reports. A finding that fits
neither list stays a judgement call that maintainers make on the report.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): list a security maintainer for report triage
Security report triage had no named owner, so an unacknowledged report had
nowhere to go except the release managers. Add a Security block to the
maintainers list, and point the follow-up path in SECURITY.md at it.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(mavlink): note that the first signing key is unauthenticated
The guide already says to provision over a trusted link, and the info box says
that changing or disabling a key requires a signed message. It does not say that
setting the first one cannot, since there is no key to sign with yet, so a reader
can come away believing provisioning itself is protected.
Say plainly that the window exists, what an attacker gets from it, and how to
recover.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* Apply batched suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* feat(security): more review fixup
* fix(security): only 1.18 gets security bugfixes
* fix(security): link to SECURITY_SCOPE
* fix(securiy): small wording fixups
* docs(security): scope by attacker position, not bug class
The "Always in scope" list made any memory corruption, race or hang a
vulnerability regardless of who can reach it. That is not how reports
have been handled: sanitizer runs in SITL have found and fixed many
such bugs as ordinary PRs, and a peer on an unsecured link already has
a shell.
Replace it with one test: a finding is a vulnerability when it gives
capability to an attacker who has neither the operator's access nor
physical access. Keep the in-tree board configuration rule, point to
the sanitizer docs, and fix two typos.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* fix(docs): formatting
* fix(maintainers): add Ramon to security as well
* docs(security): draw the boundary as a mermaid diagram
GitHub renders mermaid natively, so the boundary diagram no longer has to
be maintained as hand-aligned ASCII. Label the two zones with the wording
of the sentences below it, so the picture and the prose say the same
thing.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* fix(docs): review fixups
* docs(security): say how to isolate the offboard transports
A direct cable between flight controller and companion is not enough on
its own: the agent or router republishes into the DDS or Zenoh network
on the companion, so that network is inside the boundary too.
Keep the scope document to what is inside the boundary and put the
isolation advice next to the uXRCE-DDS and Zenoh setup instructions.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
---------
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
* fix(zenoh): generate the topic catalog into the build tree
Kconfig.topics is fully generated from the uORB message set, but the build
regenerated it into the source tree at configure time. Building any Zenoh
board therefore left the working tree dirty whenever the message set had
changed since the file was last committed (the catalog is board-config
dependent, so it drifts easily).
Generate the catalog into the build directory in cmake/kconfig.cmake, before
Kconfig is parsed, and source it from there via ZENOH_KCONFIG_TOPICS. It is
generated board-independently from every message so it no longer depends on
the msg-gating Kconfig symbols it is sourced alongside; the per-board factory
still gates which topics are actually compiled. Drop the committed catalog.
* chore(zenoh): bump zenoh-pico to the build-tree header fix
Moves zenoh-pico's generated config.h/zenoh-pico.h/library.json out of its
own source tree and into the build tree, so building no longer dirties the
submodule.
Gated on PX4/zenoh-pico#2: the pointer currently references the fix branch on
a fork and must be moved to the merged commit before this is ready.
* bump zenoh-pico