* docs(mavlink): present link encryption alongside message signing
The hardening guide told integrators that production deployments must
enable message signing, presenting it as the only way to secure a MAVLink
link. Encrypting the link below MAVLink, with an encrypted radio, a VPN or
IPsec, is at least as strong: it uses standard, reviewed cryptography, it
gives confidentiality as well as authentication, and it covers every
interface on the link rather than only MAVLink.
Present both options, and reword the passages that assumed signing was the
only one.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): develop security fixes in public pull requests
Record that fixes are developed as ordinary public pull requests, with no
private forks and no embargoed branches.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): add security scope document
Describe the boundary the code implements today: what PX4 protects, what it
assumes about the layers beneath it, what the shipped default does and does
not do, and two lists for what is always in scope and what is out. It
describes the boundary rather than pre-deciding reports. A finding that fits
neither list stays a judgement call that maintainers make on the report.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(security): list a security maintainer for report triage
Security report triage had no named owner, so an unacknowledged report had
nowhere to go except the release managers. Add a Security block to the
maintainers list, and point the follow-up path in SECURITY.md at it.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* docs(mavlink): note that the first signing key is unauthenticated
The guide already says to provision over a trusted link, and the info box says
that changing or disabling a key requires a signed message. It does not say that
setting the first one cannot, since there is no key to sign with yet, so a reader
can come away believing provisioning itself is protected.
Say plainly that the window exists, what an attacker gets from it, and how to
recover.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* Apply batched suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* feat(security): more review fixup
* fix(security): only 1.18 gets security bugfixes
* fix(security): link to SECURITY_SCOPE
* fix(securiy): small wording fixups
* docs(security): scope by attacker position, not bug class
The "Always in scope" list made any memory corruption, race or hang a
vulnerability regardless of who can reach it. That is not how reports
have been handled: sanitizer runs in SITL have found and fixed many
such bugs as ordinary PRs, and a peer on an unsecured link already has
a shell.
Replace it with one test: a finding is a vulnerability when it gives
capability to an attacker who has neither the operator's access nor
physical access. Keep the in-tree board configuration rule, point to
the sanitizer docs, and fix two typos.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5[1m]
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* fix(docs): formatting
* fix(maintainers): add Ramon to security as well
* docs(security): draw the boundary as a mermaid diagram
GitHub renders mermaid natively, so the boundary diagram no longer has to
be maintained as hand-aligned ASCII. Label the two zones with the wording
of the sentences below it, so the picture and the prose say the same
thing.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
* fix(docs): review fixups
* docs(security): say how to isolate the offboard transports
A direct cable between flight controller and companion is not enough on
its own: the agent or router republishes into the DDS or Zenoh network
on the companion, so that network is inside the boundary too.
Keep the scope document to what is inside the boundary and put the
isolation advice next to the uXRCE-DDS and Zenoh setup instructions.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
---------
Signed-off-by: Julian Oes <julian@oes.ch>
Co-authored-by: Sheren N <sherenyn@ad.uni-paderborn.de>
Co-authored-by: Hamish Willee <hamishwillee@gmail.com>
* switched instructions for clodning Micro-XRCE-DDS from v2.4.2 to v2.4.3 since v2.4.2 references a bad fast-dds tag that doesnt build
* reverted uxrce instructions changes from docs/ko docs/uk and docs/zh sin
ce they are generated automatically and should not be changed manually
* Add vitepress tree
* Update existing workflows so they dont trigger on changes in the docs path
* Add nojekyll, package.json, LICENCE etc
* Add crowdin docs upload/download scripts
* Add docs flaw checker workflows
* Used docs prefix for docs workflows
* Crowdin obvious fixes
* ci: docs move to self hosted runner
runs on a beefy server for faster builds
Signed-off-by: Ramon Roche <mrpollo@gmail.com>
* ci: don't run build action for docs or ci changes
Signed-off-by: Ramon Roche <mrpollo@gmail.com>
* ci: update runners
Signed-off-by: Ramon Roche <mrpollo@gmail.com>
* Add docs/en
* Add docs assets and scripts
* Fix up editlinks to point to PX4 sources
* Download just the translations that are supported
* Add translation sources for zh, uk, ko
* Update latest tranlsation and uorb graphs
* update vitepress to latest
---------
Signed-off-by: Ramon Roche <mrpollo@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ramon Roche <mrpollo@gmail.com>
